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The Problem of Impulse and Restraint Is Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
Thesis directed by Professor U « i d  Machls
On* of the more perplexing problems in the writings of Jean- 
Jacquee Rousseau is the apparent inconsistency between the concep- 
tions of natural impulss and restraint. Rousseau appears to ad­
vocate simultaneously the law of the heart and the restraint of 
the paaeiona.
To throw light on thle problem, Rousseau Is compared with 
lant. This compariaon reveals that the rationalist elements in 
Rousseau cluster about the conception of will, viz,. autonomy of 
the will, self-legislation, universalisatlon principle, eto. Where 
they differ noet radloally la on the function of sentiment and con­
science, the apprehension of the morel law and the status of the 
anlveraalisatlon principle. Rach of theee difficulties is exaro- 
 ined oarefully.
Pirat difference! In objeoting to the laok of subjective 
motivation in Kant's moral theory, the aseertlon will be made that 
Rousseau presents a theory of enlightened moral eentlment in which 
raaeon and eentlment are never eeparste. Roueseau's aim is to 
overcome factitious paseiona by restraint, in order to reetore 
conscience* the rationalist or Kantian element can thus be assimi- 
into his theory of eentlment. The peculiar alliance of rea­
son and sentimer.t explains the confusion emerging from bis discus­
sion of impulse and restraint.
Second differences The intertwining of reason and sentiment 
gives Rousseau a complex conception of natural law. He accepts 
the idea that moral law emanates from reason, and adds to this a 
conception of natural right derived from the natural feelings. He 
is therefore able to argue that what reason knows to be good, con- 
science senses to be good. The objective moral law known to reason 
is reflected in the conscience.
Third difference: Kant regards the universalization princi­
ple as a moral principle; Rousseau thinks of it as a moral-poli­
tical principle. This emphasis by Rousseau implies that natural 
right is built into the dynamics of the general will. To defend 
this point, particular emphasis must be placed on justice and its 
function in the act of universalization. Finally, it is assertedt h a t the general will has both objective and subjective components; 
reason and sentiment are allied in impelling us to comply with the 
general will.
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OF IMPULSE AND RESTRAINT 
On first approach, the totality of Rousseau's works appears 
as a heap of tangled thread, all of different length and hue, yet 
knotted together in such a peculiar manner as to suggest an inde­
cipherable pattern. Rousseau, man and writings, seems to embody 
Pascal's conception of human nature*
What a chimera is man] What a novelty] What a mon­
ster, what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a 
prodigy.' Judge of all things, imbecile worm of the 
earth; depository of truth, a sink of uncertainty 
and error; the pride and refuse of the universe]
Who will unravel this tangle?*
Yet there are those who claim to have unraveled the tangled 
skein and discovered a hidden unity in Rousseau's thought. The 
great unravelers, e.g., Cassirer and Hendel, would spurn the image 
of the skein; they would prefer instead the metaphor of submerged 
currents. That is, they would explain the notorious contrariety 
of Rousseau as a surface phenomenon: cross winds of rhetoric, 
paradoxical counter currents, or sheer hyperbole. But underlying 
these superficial disturbances they would find strong and regular 
undercurrents which, once grasped, would reveal a fundamental unity
in Rousseau's works.
There is no denying the appeal of some obscure pattern in 
all this diffuseness. Rousseau himself often spoke of his sys­
tem, and suggested in the Confessions that there are no fundamental
Slaise Pascal, Thoughts (Cleveland, 1955), P« 159.
2discrepancies in his major works. 2 Certainly this mode of inter­
pretation could be carried quite far} one could attribute much of 
the perplexity to Rousseau's style. His taste for epigram and 
hetorical flourish, for example, often disposed him to speak with 
ch exaggeration. Thus, when he declares that "man is born free 
!|but everywhere he is in chains,"^ we must beware of the ambiguity 
of the word 'freedom'; we must see it in the context of subsequent 
emarks on natural and moral freedom. For it becomes evident that 
this remark is not a statement of thesis; rather, it is a banner 
I,flashed before the reader's eyes in order to arrest his attention, 
e he passes beyond the first few pages, he will search in vain 
for its reappearance. Again, Rousseau's predileotion for paradox 
is oaused much confusion. That a oitizen may be "forced to be 
4
|free" means simply that he may be obliged to renounce his natural 
selfishness for the general interest, yet this remark has yielded 
all sorts of sinister interpretations. And again, the most con- 
!fusing of all Roueseauian stylistio mannerisms is the use of the 
jsame word in completely different senses. This habit is no mere 
|aloppiness on his part; he actually chose to write in this manneri 
>.we oan make our meaning clear, not always by using words in 
I the same sense, but taking care that every time we use a word 
the sense in which we use it is sufficiently indicated by the
m Jean Jacques Rousseau, Confessions (Hew York, n.d.), p. 420.
Rousseau, Social Contract, in The Social Contract and Discourse.,
1 trans. 0. D. Cole (Hew York, 1950), p. 3. ---- ~ ---- -9
*Ibid.. p. 18.
sense of the context..."5 Whatever Rousseau's intention, his 
usage in this regard has yielded very little clarity# Hence com­
mentators have attacked his notion of the natural goodness of 
human nature without attempting to reconcile it with his assertion 
that man in the state of nature is amoral* Yet, in the same work 
in which Rousseau states "man is naturally good,H he also asserts, 
"men in a state of nature, having no moral relations or determinate 
obligations one with another, could not he either good or had, 
irirtuous or vicious."^ Clearly, Rousseau is using the word 'good1 
in two different senses, supposing that we can garner the subtle 
differences from the context. Natural goodness apparently refers 
to innocence, i.e., the absence of radical evil in the pristine 
Btate of human nature; it must be understood in the context of 
Rousseau's disputes with the advocates of original sin. On the 
other hand, what is absent in the state of nature is moral good­
ness, which can only be achieved by civilized man through the re­
straint of passions.
All these difficulties must be borne in mind if one is to 
inderstand Rousseau. Even if muoh surface contrariety is dispelled 
t>y illuminating complexities of style, however, there are still 
rani fold difficulties which should be resolved. To give one minor 
illustration* The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality places 
the blame of all social evil on the institution of private prop­
erty; with the help of Robert the gardener, anile is taught very
^Rousseau, Bnile, trans. Barbara Poxley (New York, 1963), p. 72.
~  M ^ f urse Origin of Inequality. in The Socialcontract*.., p # 221, p* 273» "
m t I; la Ilf* to r«ip««t private property. If thia example proves 
toMfhit trivial, we oan point the finger of aoeuaation at one of 
IM sore nagging perplexitlea in Bouaaeau, the problem of reason 
tad aentlaent. For it aeeaa that ha adrlaes ua to both restrain 
paaaloa through reaaon, and to follow the heart while remaining 
»ry of rational aophlaaa.
lo doubt, inatanoea of a similar nature eould be multiplied 
^ndaflnltely, and auoh aweat eould be expended in debating poa- 
•ibilltiea of a total reeonolliatlon. But the queatlon which e- 
sergea lai who la qualified to apeak on the whole of Bouaaeau. 
ie who will unravel thia tangle mu at overcome a mountain of coo- 
lentarjri he aniat dlapel popular prejudloet he must ateel himself 
in face of the teaiptatlon to raviah the all-too-yleldlng general- 
tiaa of Boueaaau. Thia laat teaiptatlon ia particularly auscep- 
tible to abuse. The glittering generality of the Soolal Contract 
Bakes it aaenable to diverse interpretations) the minute detail 
fcad dlgreealona of telle often obaoure the argument. Theae olr- 
tanoea sake for oonalderable freedoai in interpretation, perhaps 
Justifying Bmeat Barker’a reaark that every man flnda hla own 
riogmae in Bouaaeau.^
The prodigious literature on Bouaeaau, combined with the in­
herent dlfflcultlea of interpretation, enjoin ae to aasums a modest 
ltlon concerning the so-culled hidden unity. It Is well to 
How here a fundamental precept of fc»i]_ei "Let us measure the
of our aphere and reoaln in lta center like a apider in its web."8
Serker, intro, to Social Contract (lew York, I960), p. xxxlr. 
lean, telle. p. 45*
4
(Rather than claiming to have discovered the true core of Rousseau,
|or the great central proposition, what will be offered here is one 
Ipossible solution to the problem of reason and sentiment. In pre- 
jsenting this problem, an attempt will be made to lay bare the 
inner dynamics of thought and sentiment and to demonstrate possi­
ble consequences such analysis may have on Rousseau's conception 
lof natural right and the general will. Because of the controversy 
that still rages over Rousseau, every attempt will be made to followI the texts as closely as possible; ample references will be supplied, in order to substantiate any claims. In other words, we will try to emulate the spider.If there is only controversy over the unity of Rousseau, there is at least agreement that very divergent tendencies are present in his works. One must bat consider the men he influenced in order to grasp the divergence, e.g., Byron, Chauteaubriand, Robbespierre, 
St. Just, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Goethe, and even James Fenimore 
Cooper. A recent work by M. Markovitch has established a strong 
link between Rousseau and Tolstoi. Of these tendencies, the one 
|which will concern us is the conflicting movements to romanticism 
jand rationalism. Baillie interprets Hegel as regarding Rousseau 
as a moral sentimentalist, whose ultimate moral principle was the 
romantic law of the heart.9 Certainly, Rousseau's remark in Emile.
I "what is felt to be right is right, what I-feel to be wrong is 
wrong, " 10 would support this assertion. Kant, on the other hand,
rHegel, Phenomenology of Mind (London, 1964), p. 390.
10Rousseau, Emile, p. 249.
6•was impressed with Rousseau's emphasis on duty and restraint of the
passions; he went so far as to call him the Newton of the moral
world. Kant's statement in the Fragments is even stronger.
There was a time when I thought that knowledge 
alone could constitute the honor of mankind, and I 
despised the common man. Rousseau set me right.
This blind prejudice vanished, I learned to respect 
human nature...
Turning immediately to Rousseau's works is not necessarily 
helpful in resolving the conflict of reason and romance. For there 
are indeed statements which indicate that he was an apostle of the 
law of the heart. "Too often does reason deceive u b ; we have a 
good right to doubt her; but conscience never deceives us, she is 
always the true guide of man...; conscience is the best casu­
ist... In the Confessions, he discusses the character of Jtae. 
de Warens, observing that she was often misled by sophisms: 
"...instead of listening to her heart, which always guided her 
right, she listened to her reason, which guided her wrongly."^
However, there is also an abundance of statements which indi­
cate that Rousseau advocated a rationalist ethic, and rejected the 
guide of impulse. No more than a handful of pages after his as­
sertion that conscience is the best casuist, he claims, "Has he 
not given me conscience that I may love the right, reason that. T 
May perceive it. and freedom that I may choose it. Emile is
■^ Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (New York, 
1954), p. 39.
i^n Carl Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge, 1948), p. 160.
^ Emile. p. 249. 
^Confessions. p. 203. 
1W l e .  p. 257.
7portrayed as being grateful to his tutor for teaching him to submit 
to reason and thereby escape bondage to the passions. After claim­
ing in Emile that individual conscience is a law anterior to public 
opinion, and thus the judge of it, Rousseau claims there is still 
another judges "It is, therefore, important to cultivate a faculty 
which serves as judge between the two guides, which does not permit 
conscience to go astray and corrects the errors of prejudice. That 
faculty is reason. 1,1 ^
The impact of these remarks no doubt caused David Hume to 
observe depreciatingly, "Really, his Waitings are so full of Ex­
travagance, that I cannot believe their Eloquence alone will sup­
port t h e m . P e r h a p s  Hume's evaluation is not unjustified, for 
Rousseau does speak as if he were both rationalist and romantic.
He seems to advocate both the law of impulse and the restraint of 
the passions; he is both Newton of the moral world and "consciousness 
gone crazy. " 18 Like Gloucester in King Lear, he has spawned two 
sons, whose very existences are sources of endless conflict. Most 
oommentators have tried to prove that either one or the other,
Edmund or Edgar, is the bastard son. What shall be attempted here 
is a reconciliation between the sons of Gloucester. That is, the 
tension between reason and sentiment may indicate they are insep­
arable; the exclusive preference of one over the other would lead 
to either formalism or subjectivism. Although(Rousseau's language 
nay be ambiguous, his position, it is submitted, is that reason
^Bmile. p.T^ 5.
17Hume, Letters of David Hume (Oxford, 1932), in Cassirer, p. 13. 
*-%egel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 396.
and sentiment mist work ia close harmony If morality Is to bs ach­
ieved.
The romantic element in Rousseau is well known, and requires 
no further documentation hero. The rational element, however, is 
less commonly known* it is this aspect of Bousssau that must be 
emphasized in order to get an adequate conception of his thought.
In order to aohieve this end, it will bs helpful to present his 
position by means of an extended comparison with Kant. The intent 
is of oourss not to preeent an exhaustivs sxamination and criti- 
oism of Kantian morality but msrsly to uss it as a backdrop, against 
which ths diffuse statements of Rousseau csn be brought into sharp­
er focus. It is hoped that by demonstrating the similarities, 
the differences will become mvsn more apparent. Without this con­
scious imposition of order it Is conceivable that one could be 
lost in the turbulence of Rousseau'e presentation.
The characterietio to be exploited here Is the formalism of
Kant's moral theory. In contrast to Rousseau’s dlffUseness, Kant 
presents an iapreeeive array of formal principles) it strikss one 
a* s catalogued and mounted oolleotion of abetractions, pressnted 
in an intricate system of arrangement) here the image of the ar­
chivist or ourator leaps to oonsolousness* And one may rightly 
ask, where is man In this musty collection? There is an implicit 
humanity embedded In Kant's system, but it is obscured by the for- 
»al apparatus and the high level of abstraction. His rigorism can 
be mitigated by the Lectures on Ithlcst remarks garnered from these 
works reveal an evident sympathy with Rousseau. Before proceeding
9to this early work, however, it is necessary to examine the form­
alized system, seeking out similarities to Eousseau, and raising 
criticisms that follow from Rousseau's position. By this proce­
dure, the conflict and reconciliation of impulse and restraint 
will become clear.
In order to effect this plan, we shall emulate Kant's own 
procedure. We shall proceed to examine his major principles in 
a systematic manner, attempting to couple each with the germ of 
the idea in Rousseau. We shall pass through the system as if it 
were a catalogued collection of specimens, reading all the labels 
and noting the arrangements. Once the tour is complete, we shall 
try to demonstrate that Kant's theory incorporates only a part of 
Rousseau's. What Kant neglects may prove a pertinent criticism 
of what he incorporated.
THE KANTIAN OR RATIONALIST ELEMENT IN ROUSSEAU
I. Restraint of the Passions.
Kant.1 We are often aware of constraint while experiencing 
the pangs of desire. We are goaded by passion, and, at the same 
time, restrained by a sense of duty. If a man's behavior could 
be wholly explained by external determinations, e.g., glands, 
culture, climate, eto., he could not be thought of as a self-de­
termining moral agent. There could be no way he could choose duty 
over inclination. His free choice would be, as Hobbes claims, the 
final passion in the chain of deliberation. But the sense of duty 
assures us that we axe not Hobbesian men; it gives us the convic­
tion that we are not passive receptacles for external or bodily 
causes. The conflict of duty and desire holds out the possibility 
of autonomy, of action in which we are the determining cause.
In a famous passage, Kant illustrates the primacy of restraint 
and duty over inclination in determining true moral worth. The 
niggardly man, who acts generously simply from duty, has greater 
worth than the benevolent man, whose Inclination disposes him to 
philanthropy. ^
Rousseam The popular image of Rousseau often envisages him 
as an apostle of romantic individualism. He is depicted as a li­
bertine, to whom the slightest restraint was hateful. Indeed, 
there are remarks in the Confessions which could substantiate
*9Iant, Metaphysics of Morals (New York, 1949), pp. 18, p. 16.
CHAPTER II
this claim: M*•.restraint and subjection of any kind are to me
it all times unbearable, they would make me hate even pleasure
20itself*M This trait in Rousseau's character is quickly seized 
upon by Mari tain, whose writing on Rousseau thus is closer to 
character assasination than to philosophical criticism. ^  Weak­
nesses in the man, however, are not necessarily weaknesses in his 
ideas; however disastrous Rousseau's attempts at self-discipline, 
his intention clearly lay in the control of the passions* The 
Nouvelle Heloise, a novel of no meager proportions, is devoted to 
the ideal of restraint* St* Preux, the protagonist, whose attrac­
tion to Julie engulfs him in a perpetual struggle of jarring pas­
sions, must finally confess that ,fhe is a wretch indeed who scru- 
pies giving up one day of pleasure to the duties of humanity. "22 
In the Social Contract.Rousseau makes even a firmer declaration 
in favor of restraintt
...only, when the voice of duty takes the place of 
physical impulse and the right of appetite, does man, 
who so far considered only himself, find he is forced 
to aot on different principles and consult his reason 
before listening to his inclinations. ^
Rousseau's abstract zeal for self-mastery was so great that
on occasion he approached Kant's rigorism. In the Reveries he
writes, "there is no virtue in following one's inclinations...
Confessions, p. 196.
21J. Maritain. Three Reformersj Descartes, Luther and Rousseau 
(Mew York, 1937 ), pp. 96 ff. ------- -
22La Novelle Heloise (London, 1776), p. 136.
Social Contract, p. 18.
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"but virtue consists in conquering them when duty commands."^ 
Rousseau adds, characteristically, that this he is less able to 
do than any mortal.
II. Autonomy of the Will.
Kant: Knowledge is only possible by means of the forms of 
sensuous intuition and the categories of the understanding; they 
must be imposed on the manifold of sensuous intuition if we are 
to have any experience whatsoever. J!an, if he is to be understood 
as a part of nature, must be understood by means of the categories. 
Therefore, his acts in the world must be subsumed under the cate­
gory of causality, i.e., as a link in the necessary causal chains 
of nature. But if man is enmeshed in causal chains, he is not 
free, and there can be no morality without freedom.
The conflict of freedom and necessity is resolved for Kant 
in the third antimony of pure reason. The empirical self, as un­
derstood through the categories, is necessarily conditioned by 
events in nature, i.e., the world of phenomena as it is structured 
by the understanding. But reason presents us with the possibility
of a noumenal self "which is itself free from all laws of nature,"25 
and thus can function as an unconditioned moral agent. Kant of
course can offer no proofs of such freedom, for assertions about
noumena would be an overextension of the legitimate use of the
understanding. But he can claim the practical necessity of freedom
as a prerequisite for morality. Pure reason presents us with the
24Rousseau, Reveries (London. 1927), p. 122.
| 25_
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (London, 1889), p. 210.
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Idea of possible freedom beyond the world of phenomenal nature;
•*« *uet use this idea aa a regulative principle, if there is to 
be any morality at all.
If we poatulate a freedom beyond the world of appearance,
■we can conoeive of the will as autonomous, i.e., as unconditioned 
by empirioal causes. We oan think of it aa "the faculty of deter- 
aining oneself in accordance with the conception of certain laws."2  ^
But the laws which we legislate for ourselves are of a different 
order than the laws necessitated by the categories. They are 
laws of freedom, laws whioh we as rational beings, give to our­
selves.
Rousseaui There are pasaagea in which Rousseau suggests a 
resolution of freedom and necessity whioh la quito similar to Kant's 
antimony. In tolle, he presents, albeit vaguely, the distinction 
of empirical and transcendental selvesi "man is not one; I will 
and I will not; I feel myself at once a slave and a free man; I 
am aotlve when I listen to the voice of reason; I am paasive when 
I carried away by my paasions. " 27 In Inequality, the germ of 
the dlatinction between freedom and necessity is found* "the 
power of willing or ohoosing is nothing but acts whioh are purely 
spiritual and wholly inexplioable by the laws of mechaniam.
Finally, he states unambiguously the concept of self-legislatiom
man acquires in the civil atate, moral liberty, which 
alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere 
impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a
VetathjBlcs of Morals, pp. 55, p. 44 
37telle, p. 241; cf. also p. 243. 
2oInequallty. p. 200.
!law w© prescribe to ourselves is liberty. 9^ tfe should be grossly mistaken if we concluded from the above it Bousseau was anticipating a critical theory of knowledge,
Bseau's distinction of freedom and human bondage rests squarely 
the acceptance of Cartesian dualism. Material substance oper— 
b according to mechanism; freedom is only possible in a radically
i.erent realm of spiritual substance* ^  Thus Bousseaufs dis— 
stion is metaphysical, rather than epistemological. How free 
I affects the mechanical world is for Rousseau completely in- 
jrehensible. But he does not trust abstract reason, and has no 
for metaphysical subtleties. He would reject the whole of 
Ionian mechanics if it contradicted the freedom revealed directly 
is consciousness. "How do I know that there are spontaneous 
ments? I tell you, 'I know it because I feel them'...In vain 
d anyone try to argue me out of this feeling, for it is stronger 
any proofs." ^ 1 
The Moral Law.
Kant: When we act from a sense of duty in order to overcome 
Iso, we are acting for the sake of the moral law. The moral 
if it is to be the ultimate souroe of all morality, must be 
Ly formal, i.e., it must be valid for all rational beings, 
se moral laws ought to hold for all rational creatures we must 
re them from the general concept of a rational b e i n g .  "32 jf
tial Contract, p. 19. 
le, p. 236.
•}1Ibid., p. 234.
Metaphysics of 1'orals, pp. 35» P« 29.
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it were derived from empirical grounds, it would vary from culture 
to culture; it would be debased by all sorts of subjectivism, since 
feelings, which "naturally differ infinitely in degree cannot fur­
nish a uniform standard of good and evil."33 Only if the moral law 
is a priori, i.e., a necessary and universal principle of practical 
reason, can it be thought to hold for all rational beings. It must 
universal in its application to all creatures with reason; it 
must be necessary, in that it imposes itself categorically, as an 
unconditioned command.
For Kant, it is not enough that we act in accordance with the
moral law. Rather, we must act for the sake of the law. An act
in accordance with counsels of prudence or imperatives of skill
is not an act of moral worth, since Inclination is the spring of
the action. We would be like the honest shopkeeper, who appears
to act for the sake of the law, but is really governed by counsels
of prudence. Only when we act from respect of the law, for the sake
of duty, does our action have moral worth. "Neither fear nor
inclination, but simply respect for the law is the spring which
34can give our aotions moral worth."
The feeling of respect accompanies, or at least ought to 
accompany, our apprehension of the moral law. Kant introduces it 
to exphin perhaps the phenomenal manifestation of rational voli­
tion; it is the conscious counterpart of a free act of rational 
will, by which we determine ourselves to act for the sake of the 
law. Respect, properly speaking, is thus not an inclination;
Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 74, p. 59.
4^Ibid.. pp. 71, p. 56.
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rather it is a feeling generated hy the apprehension of the law.
Once reason has grasped the law and respect is generated, respect
becomes a motive for following the law, rather than a spring of
35action. J
Rousseau: Rousseau asserts that there is an objective moral 
law ascertainable by reason.
All justice comes from God, who is its sole source... 
there is a universal justice emanating from reason 
alone; but this justice, to be admitted among us, 
must be mutual. Humanly speaking, in default of 
natural sanctions, the laws of justice are inef­
fectual among men,36
In this very Hobbesian passage, Rousseau remarks the unwisdom of
obeying universal laws of justice, without assurance others follow
them. Adherence to the moral law, without guarantees of universal
compliance, only promotes "the good of the wicked and the undoing 
37of the just." In place of universal justice, Rousseau would 
have laws and conventions.
In Emile, Rousseau swings over on another tack. If the law 
of universal justice is without effect in governing the affairs 
of men, there is at least one man who can be taught to obey its 
commands. But this man cannot be found, he must be created.
Thus Emile must be subjected to an elaborate and peculiar educa­
tion if respect for the moral law is to be elicited from him.
A new element in the apprehension of the moral law is stressed 
in jaile. Universal justice is not merely an enanation from reason
Metaphysics of Korals, pp. 56, p. 44; cf. also pp. 22, p. 19, footnote. 
^Social Contract, p. 34.
'^ Ibld.. p. 34.
17
j  alone; not only in reason, but in the heart of man is it to be 
found. "There is therefore at the bottom of our hearts an innate 
prinoiple of justice and virtue. A g a i n ,  "Conscience.1 Consci­
ence.* Divine instinct, immortal voice from heaven; sure guide for 
a creature ignorant...infallible judge of good and evil."39
What Rousseau means by the human heart or conscience is cer­
tainly not clear. Nor is the relation of reason to conscience 
particularly transparent. Discussion of these obscurities must 
be postponed, however. In passing, what should be noted is that 
the moral law for Rousseau is manifested both in reason and in the 
so-called human heart. In view of his remarks on the restraint of 
passions, it should also be evident that the human heart is some­
thing quite different from passions. But the actual nature of the 
noral law cannot be grasped until the problem of impulse and re­
straint is resolved.
IV. The Categorical Imperative.
Kant: The will of a rational being is self-legislative, i.e., 
it gives itself subjective maxims as principles of action. But an 
absolutely good will, acting for the sake of the moral law, must 
will universally valid maxims. That is, its subjective maxim must 
apply to all rational creatures; it must conform to the rulet "Act 
only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will it 
should become a universal law. "40 The a priori moral law then,
^Emile. p.~~2S2.
39Ibld.. p. 254.
Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 47, p. 38.
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which holds universally and necessarily for all men, is the cate­
gorical imperative. It is this supreme principle of morality which 
we must legislate for ourselves as our subjective maxim. When the 
will determines itself for the sake of this universal principle, 
then, contends Kant, "reason extorts from us immediate respect for 
such legislation."4*
Rousseau: It is generally acknowledged that Rousseau's basic 
contribution to Kantian morality is the general will, which Kant 
reworked into the categorical imperative. When an individual wills 
in common with other men to pursue some common good, his particular 
will merges with the general will. That is, what he wills for all 
men in society, he wills for himself. A strong case could be made 
for the insistence that the general will rests solely on a communi­
ty of shared interests, but it must not be forgotten that Rousseau 
claims it to be an admirable agreement of justice and utility.^
Part of the argument for justice lies no doubt in his assertion 
that no man is unjust to himself; the respect he shows for his 
own person will be generalized by the mechanics of the general 
will. This argument could be further extended by drawing on Rou­
sseau's remarks about an innate sense of justice, but such develop­
ment must be postponed until the relation of impulse and restraint 
to the moral law is clarified.
A final comment must be made. The general will contains the 
root of what has become known in contemporary ethics as the princi­
ple of universality. Rousseau, however, believes that neither
41Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 24, p. 21, 
^^ Social Contract, p. 30.
19
I poets nor philosophers can legislate for all mankind* The general 
will is local in its application, i.e., it is restricted to social 
orders in which an awareness of common interests is dominant.
While Kant and contemporary modern writers talk of universalizing 
laws for all men, Rousseau regarded the city state as the ideal 
circumstance for the functioning of the general will. What Rou­
sseau had in mind is Berne or Geneva, or an idealization of Sparta 
and the early Roman Republic.
V. Kingdom of Ends,
Kant: The mechanism of the general will is evidently being 
manipulated in Kant's discussion of the kingdom of ends. If every 
rational being acted at all times as if he were a member of this 
ideal kingdom, he would be at the same time obeying the universal 
laws he has legislated for all men.^
Rousseau: The kingdom of ends is the ideal social order in 
which the general will never falls mute. If every man always wills 
in accordance with the general will, he is both subject and sov­
ereign; he gives and obeys the laws he wills for all men in his 
particular society. Rousseau is not particularly sanguine in his 
attitude toward such an ideal community, for it is not certain that 
reason always exhorts from us respect of such universal legislation. 
It can not be left to each man's conscience whether or not he will 
obey the general will. "Whosoever refuses to obey the general 
will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means
Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 69, p. 55*43
nothing 1« «  than he will be forced to be free." 
n. Contradiction of the Will.
Kanti A maxi* la In accordance with the coral la* only it 
oan serve as a univ*r*al principle for *11 men. To t**t th* 
■axl«, we «m*t a** If universal1sing it leada to a contradiction 
of the *411 • To will that lying should become universal, for ex­
ample, la oontradlotory, since th* very poaaibillty of a lia de- 
panda on othara* truthfuln*aa. Thia illustration night oause ona 
to believe that Kant «a* attempting to give a purely logioal crit­
erion for judging maxima. But h* provides us with an example which 
la not of thla nature. If a prosperous man *11 la nlggardllneaa aa 
universal rule, he la involved In contradiction, for he nay some 
day need aealatance himself. Thla example nay have proven peatl- 
lent for Kantian oomnentatore, but It flta aaaily into Rouaaeau'a 
poaltlon.
Rous seam Insofar aa men puraue a common goal, they are ig­
nited In a general will. But when partloular intaraata are ele­
vated over th* general interest, the general *111 breaka down into 
th* *111 of all, 1.*., th* sum of partloular conflicting willa.
Ttoa, when th* proaperowe man will a that th*r* shall be no gener- 
oalty to the dlstreaaed, the g«n*ral will br*aka down Into the 
disparate will* of the for tuna t* and th* unfortunate. Prop*rly 
•peaking, a contradiction of the will la, for Rouaae«at a conflict 
of lBt*r*ata.
u ----------Social Contract, p. 18.
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VII. Principle of Humanity.
Kant: Kant presents an alternative formulation to the cate­
gorical imperative: "To act as to treat humanity whether in thine 
own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, 
never as a means. "^5 We COgn±ZGin^  Qf ^he rationality of
other men, and of their capacity for self-legislation# It is in 
the autonomy of the will, in the capacity to act as a free moral 
agent, that Kant finds the basis of human dignity. 46
The phrase ’humanity as an end-in-itself', coupled with the 
remark that Kant had learned to respect human nature, suggests that 
Kant would allow diluting the stringency of the moral law. But 
this is not the case. It is because a person is the carrier of 
the law that we are obliged to respect him. "Respect for a per­
son is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, etc.) of 
which he gives us an example.
Rousseaui Rousseau presents two reasons why one should re­
spect human nature. The first is similar to Kant's in that it 
stresses the significance of autonomous action. It is the capa­
city for self-determination rather than reason which distinguishes 
nen from brutes; it is in the consciousness of this liberty that 
the spirituality of his soul is revealed.
The second, reason emerges from an awareness of what Rousseau 
calls the "essentials of humanity." For, woven into his ceaseless
45Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 57, p. 49.
46IMd.. pp. 67, p. 53.
^ Ibid.. pp. 22, p. 19.
^Inequality. p. 208.
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raillery against the present condition of human society, is the 
theme of a common humanity.
By nature men are neither kings, nobles, nor million­
aires* All men are born poor and naked; all are lia­
ble to the sorrows of life, its disappointments, its 
ills, its needs, its suffering of every kind; and all 
are condemned at length to die. That is what it really 
means to be a man, this is what no mortal can escape.49
Here Rousseau emphasized the capacity of imagination to enter the 
feelings of another, less because they are rational than because 
they are sentient b e i n g s .  50 The origin of this response is natu­
ral feelings which are prior to reason, viz. the instinct for self- 
preservation and the natural repugnance at seeing any sensible 
creature suffer pain or death.
Summary
The common elements in Kant and Rousseau cluster about the 
conception of will. Both emphasize restraint of the passions by 
reason, and the principle of self-legislation. In both cases, 
their respective positions require a conception of the autonomy 
of the will. The principle of universality is presented as the 
general will by Rousseau, and the categorical imperative by Kant.
Both acknowledge an inherent worth in human nature, but not nec­
essarily for the same reasons.
The most radical difference is the stress Kant places on rea­
son and purity of duty, in contrast with Rousseau's insistence 
on conscience. This difference, we have seen, yielded divergent
49Bmile. p. 183.
^Inequality, p. 194.
views on how the moral law is apprehended. Finally, while Housseau 
regarded the general will as a political principle, Kant cut it 
away from its civic moorings, and raised it to the supreme princi­
ple of morality.
It is to these three differences viz. (l) conscience, (2) mor­
al law, and (3) general will that we must now turn. For they not 
only prove to he a significant criticism of Kant, hut will yield 
a possible solution to the problem of impulse and restraint.
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CHAPTER III 
ROUSSEAU'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENT 
The first difference we encounter is between reason and the 
human heart* Por Kant, the moral law is indeed a principle ema­
nating from reason alone; it is through sheer apprehension of the 
law that we are constrained to act for the sake of it* If the 
motive of our actions were anything other than pure duty, then our 
acts would be determined by impulse, and we would no longer be free.
Kant's explanation of how the autonomous will so determines 
our action is difficult to understand, however* In one sense we 
are enmeshed in causal chains? in another we are free moral agents 
giving ourselves a maxim. The question of how an act can be both 
free and determined, i.e., noumenal and phenomenal, is perplexing, 
and causes suspicion that Kant's distinction of two realms may be 
untenable. Of course, apprehension of law is said to generate 
respect, but the response of respect is merely correlated with an 
act of the free will. Clearly there can be no antecedent feeling 
which impels us to follow the law, for then that feeling would be 
mere impulse.
If there is uniformity in nature, there must be uniformity 
in human actions, insofar as we understand nature as phenomena.
But if a free act in the noumenal realm is to be efficacious in 
the world of appearance, it must noticeably upset the uniformity 
of nature. Indeed, the possibility of such interaction vitiates 
any talk of uniformity. As Lewis White Beck observes, this is a
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hard doctrine to acoept.51 oannot explain how the eajne event
can be a necessary conaequenoe of preceding events and also be de­
termined by a free sot of will.
Doubtless there are ways to re-interpret Kant so that the hard­
ness of his doctrine oan be mollified. But the issue at hand is not 
nerely the phenomena-noumena distinction. Bren on strictly phen­
omenological grounds, Rousseau would have a serious quarrel with 
an ethical argument asserted on purely rational grounds. Suppose 
for a moment that we are no longer oonoerned with the purity of 
an aot of obligation, or the problem of freedom within a strictly 
deterministic conception of nature. Rather focus attention on the 
idea of a purely rational law. Regarding suoh principles, Rousseau 
would contend that reason alone oan generate no efficacious moral 
sentimental respect of the law, as Kant conoeivee it, is mere chi­
mera. A purely rational rule no more generates moral sentiment 
than the Pythagorean theorem, unless there are certain tendencies 
in man which impel him to accept the law, onoe reason reveals it.
In the Profession of Faith. Rousseau states emphatically, "To know 
the good is not to love it...as soon as reason leads him to per- 
eeive it, his conscience Impels him to love itj it is this feel- 
ing which is Innate." Reason may present ue with a rule, but 
unleae there is some disposition within us to obey it, it lacks the
impulse to obey it, it is a mere empty principle. One knows one's
5V  W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant's "Critique of PractlaiO Reason" 
(Chicago, 19&>), r. 191.
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duty but only lack* the la pula* to obey it, a circumstance abun­
dantly lllu*tr»t*d In tb* Confo**lon*. H**p*ct for tb* moral law 
mat spring froa within, from con*ol*nc*| it cannot b* generated 
by a*r« Intellectual appr*h*n*lon of tb* law. Thu*, oonolud** 
Rousseau, "Raason alon* 1* not *ufflci*nt foundation for virtue.
F*rhap* an example would b**t illustrat* Rousacau's objection. 
Vb*n James I, upon entering Newark, exercised hi* conception of 
royal pr*rogativ* by hanging a cutpurs*, it was clear to most Eng­
lishman that Jaat**'* idea of juatio* wa* oomewhat distorted.^4 
T*t had Jam**'* flrat *ct of arbltrarln*** b**n to appoint the 
cutpura* Chanc*llor of th* Exohequer, we oould still say that
wa* ao ting unjustly) 1.*., th* punl*ha*nt do** not fit th* 
cria*. Had th* outpura* b**n oastrated, disemboweled and quart­
ered, a prooodur* not unhoard of in Jacobean England, our s*n** 
of juatio* would have been outraged. In all three oases, our Judg­
ment of Jam**'* supposed actions do** not roat on principle* eman- 
atlng from reason alone. Of course, an argument may be made from 
common law, 1.*., certain oonoeptlons of justice are inatill*d 
through centuries of praotloo. But thi* still doesn't explain 
the sense of outrage which is oauaed by the laat example. What 
seeaa to b* the o*a* 1* that th*r* *r* *yapath*tlo tendenoies in 
a*n which axe excited by such aot* of oallou* brutality. This, 
at l***t, I would tak* to bo Boussoau'o position. Th* d*cr**a 
of oonsoisnee are not judgment* but **ntia*nt*| our response to
*-telle, p. 253.I.  Vlcols, *d., Progresses of ting Ja— s tho First (London. 1828), 9* 87.
the moral law rests as much on sentiment as it doeson reason. To 
separate them, and to denigrate feeling, as Kant is obliged to do 
by the exigencies of his system, is to make a severance that can 
never be healed. To rephrase Kant's aphorismi springs of action 
without principles are blind; principles without springs of action
55are empty.
What is needed by Kant's purely formalistic morality is an 
underpinning of moral sentiment, which would impel one to accept 
the moral law. We must turn to Rousseau for this theory of senti­
ments. But in rejecting principles of reason as the sole founda­
tion of morality, and interjecting moral sentiments into the dis­
cussion, it may be asked whether, in our madness to avoid the shoal 
we shall not be lost at sea. Kant repeatedly warns that sentiment 
in morality leads only to bottomless subjectivism; it can never 
serve as part of the foundations of a moral system. Of course, 
in Lectures, Kant does admit conscience, but its function is juri­
dical rather than legislative. To illustrate its significance, 
Kant provides for us a clever medieval morality play. The Prose­
cutor of the Heart, who accuses us of a violation of the moral 
law, must face the advocate, Self Love, who argues in our defense. 
The case is argued before Conscience, who either condemns or ac­
quits us. But, Kant stresses, such legal proceedings would not 
be in order were there no objective Moral Law, which issues from
55"A contemporary example of this severance of reason and sentiment 
is found in Singer's Generalization in Ethics (New York, 1961). 
Singer attempts to display the categorical imperative as a purely 
rational principle with legitimate use in ethical reasoning.
But when he comes to explain why we should use it, he can offer 
no other reasons except prudence.
reason and not sentiment# "A good conscience demands a pure law* ” 
Conscience can only judge us for not acting in accordance with the 
law; it can never be a spring to action,
Hegel was also distressed by theories of moral feeling, the 
go-called 'law of the heart1 which had gained so much prominence 
among his contemporaries. He claimed that if feeling were given 
full scope, there would be as many laws as there were hearts; we 
would be thrown into war of each against all by this consciousness 
gone crazy. "The heart throb for the welfare of mankind passes 
therefore into the rage of frantic self conceit.
To defend Rousseau from these accusations of unbridled sub­
jectivism, we must attempt to understand his theory of natural 
Bentiments. In this regard, Cassirer, who argues for the rational 
elements in Rousseau, remarks that popular opinion conceives of 
him ae the innovator of a cult of feeling, in response to the one­
sided rationalism of the philosophes. To dispel this prejudice, 
Cassirer emphasizes the strong rationalist strain in Rousseau; he 
does so, however, at the expense of feeling, particularly Rousseau' 
interest in the moral sense theories of Shaftesbury, Butler, and 
iButchenson. Rousseau's discussion of the liandevi 11 e-Shaftes­
bury dispute shows Indisputably that he is on the side of a natural 
sympathy in all men.^ The basio theme of Bnlle is the cultivation 
of the moral sentiments. An even clearer Indication of his lean-
^ectures on Ethics (New York, 1963), p. 132.
*57"Hegel, Phenomenology of Kind, p. 397.
^Cassirer, pp. 100 ff.
^ Inequality. pp. 224 ff.
lugs in this direction is hie emulation in the Nouvelle Heloise 
of Richardson1 s Clarissa, which, with Pamela, was said to initiate 
the literature of sensibility in England,
Cassirer, however, would have us believe that Rousseau had 
completely abandoned any notion of sympathetic feelings. "Rousseau—  
in opposition to the predominant opinion of the century— eliminated 
feeling from the foundations of ethics. " 60 This is a curiou8 re_
mark} to accept it, we would have to act as if the first fifty-six 
pages of Book IV of Bnile did not exist; we would he obliged to 
ignore the statement which appears as a footnote in Inequality. 
as well as in other places, viz, that all humanity and virtue e— 
merges from the primitive feelings of self-love and compassion*^ 
Cassirer is concerned with the origins of society, and not with 
cultivation of moral sentiment in a single man. Thus, he has super­
ficial grounds for his assertions, since Rousseau does contend that 
there are no primary instincts which compel men to enter society; 
of man is to accept the social order, he must be forced by fortui­
tous circumstances. The argument of Emile, however, is of a dif­
ferent character. Wan in the hypothetical state of nature is amo­
ral, but he does have within the seeds of morality, which can bs 
developed by proper education. The foundation of this moral edu­
cation is the cultivation of the natural feelings. This is not a 
denial of Cassirer's case for an ethics of obligation; certainly 
the first part of this paper could substantiate his claims. But
Cassirer, p. 99.
^ Inequality, p. 223.
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it is an accusation that Cassirer^ interpretation is very one­
sided* In order to render his position consistent, it does seem 
necessary to preclude whole passages from the discussion# In other 
words, Cassirer, in his passion to defend Edmund, would banish 
Edgar from court.
There is no lack of evidence that Rousseau accepted a theory 
of moral sentiments to serve as the springs to action. But he did 
not accept it in the form presented by Shaftesbury, viz. that dis­
interested benevolence and the moral sense are natural springs of 
action found in every man. There may be natural impulses of this 
nature, but for Rousseau they are rarely found in civilized men.
He is quick to admit the germs of such sentiments are present in 
inchoate form in the natural man, who is not perverse hy nature.
"The impulses of nature are always right, there is no original
62perversity in the human heart.” But the natural springs to ac­
tion have been stopped up by factitious passions inculcated by 
society. Like the statue of Glaucus, human nature has been dis­
figured by layers of prejudice and perversion acquired from social 
existence. In describing these natural feelings, Rousseau uses 
a very apt metaphor. The natural springs to action are pure 
mountain streams, which have become swollen into rampaging rivers 
and, in the case of Rousseau himself, have become lost in tumul­
tuous seas. Borrowing a phrase from Butler, we may say that the 
eye of conscience (the moral sense) is not merely cloudy but opaque 
from the mirings of social existence. It is imperative, therefore,
^Stnile, p. 56.
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•to separate the natural feelings from factitious passions. 63 
“Asidst so many prejudices and factitious passions, one must know 
now to snalyse properly the human heart, in order to disentangle 
the true feelings of nature. " 64
For Rousseau, evil is the product of social existence. This 
does not mean that the abstraot man in ths state of nature is mor­
ally good} being isolated from other men, he is neither good nor
L____
Rousseau, following his peoulisr habit, uses the same term in 
different senses, snd different terms in the same sense. He 
claims ths voice of conscience is a feeling; in other contexts, 
he oalls it a divine instinct. He speaks of impulses of the 
heart, when he really means sentiment rather than a physical 
spring to action. The words 'sentiment' and 'passion' are not 
used consistently.
In order to dispel some of this confusion, it is necessary 
to standardize the vooabulary. The following designations will 
be used throughout this paper.
1. Feeling or Impulset These are natural springs to action,
1.e., inclinations arising instinctually from bodily causes. 
Certain sophisticated responses ars present in this category,
▼it. self-love snd compassion. In the natural man, self-love 
is merely the instinct for self-preservation; compassion is the 
instinct to snter into the suffering of others.
2. Passioni The word 'passion' is used in the Spinozistio 
sense. It refers to any emotion implanted in man by external 
forces such as society. Envy is an sxample.
3. Sentiment! The sentimente are emotions which have been cul­
tivated from the natural impulsss of self-love and compassion.
It refers to smotions whioh are idealistic, rathsr than natur­
alistic; the sentiments therefore are what Rousseau means by
the human heart. In this ostegory are Included self-esteem, 
generosity, justice, eto. Since these sentiments must be cul­
tivated from natural impulses, it is dear than natural man can 
have no sentiments; his responses are limited to Impulses. It 
is for this he is said to be amoral, while civilized man, who 
has at least the possibility of regulating his sentiments and 
controlling his impulses, is said to be moral or immoral.
4. Conscience or the Moral Sense» Although the responses of 
conscience seem to spring to consciousness as if they were spon­
taneous impulses, it is not properly speaking instinctual in
the sense that self-preservation is instinctual. This is made 
clear by Rousseau's sasertion that conscience is often silenced 
by the power of factitious passions; conscience regains its au­
thority only after cultivation of the moral sentiments.
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bad# But he does contain the seed of morality, which could flower 
into ethical life, were it not for the corrupt society into which 
he is unwittingly tossed* What must be done then is the preser­
vation of the natural feelings, so that the channels of moral sen­
timent can again be opened* As Rousseau asserts, ,fto preserve or 
restore the natural feelings is our main business*,f^ 5
To restore the natural feelings we must overcome the preju­
dices and unnatural desires inculcated by society——this is clearly 
the work of reason* We must understand our culture, its madnesses 
and perversions, and seek to repress its deleterious effects on 
personality. We must grasp the true course of nature, and seek 
to bring human behavior in harmony with it. For Rousseau is ada­
mant in his assertion that there can be no return to nature as 
such. Rather what is natural must be restored within existing 
society by the artifice of reason.
Once fully developed, the responses of conscience have an 
immediacy similar to instinct, but its evaluations are in the 
form of immediate apprehension or intuition rather than primi­
tive feeling. The immediate certainty of its response gives it 
the authority of an inner legislator which demands unquestioned 
supremacy over the springs of action.
Even the word intuition is not exactly what Rousseau may in­
tend. In Confessions, Rousseau speaks of a sixth or moral sense, 
"with which few hearts are endowed and without which it is im­
possible for anyone to understand my own.” (p. 566) What he 
seems to have in mind here is a sort of inner moral eye, whose 
intuition has the immediate certainty of vision. In order to 
designate this intuitive character, I have used the very inade­
quate word of 'sensing1 for the responses of this "sixth or 
moral sense."
^ Confessions, p# 565*
65Emile. p. 353.
We can see, therefore, the peculiar addition Rousseau makes 
the theory of moral sentiments while, at the same time, drawing 
heavily on rationalist elements. The restoration of conscience 
is contingent on the restraint of factitious passions which in­
flame our sensibilities. It is reason which must establish order 
among the passions, so that the conditions necessary for the cul­
tivation of morality can be recovered. This explains why Bousseau 
can speak of both natural impulse and restraint as vital factors 
in the moral life.
In contrast with Cassirer, who stops at the rationalist ar­
gument, what is suggested here is that the Kantian element in 
Rousseau can be assimilated into a theory of moral sentiment. Re­
straint of the passions is necessary if we are to overcome the 
prejudices of factitious men; self—legislation is demanded if we 
are to return to the true oourse of nature. A doctrine of the 
autonomy of the will is demanded, if Bousseau is to reoonoile re- 
atraint by reason with the materialist doctrines in vogue in eigh­
teenth century Prance. But what Rousseau wants, particularly in 
Bnlle. is not to make self—legislation a means to act in aocord 
with rules of reason. Rather, it would serve to restore cons­
cience, that feeble inner voioe which has been silenced by "the
66crowd of eager passions which cheat remorse." To restore con­
science, the impediments to the moral sentiments must be removed 
and constantly held at bay. Thus reason must remain in perpetual 
allianoe with conscience, acting as its guide, and also as its
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follower* Restraint and sentiment are never separate; they are 
inextricably mixed together, in such a way that Rousseau is indeed 
both rationalist and romantic*
In order to make Rousseau's position as clear as possible, 
we shall in the Kantian manner catalogue conceivable positions 
one could take on reason and sentiment in ethical theory*
I* Reason could be the sole foundation of morality* Pre­
cepts or rules ascertainable by reason alone are the 
source of all principles of morality. Kant's moral 
theory has already provided us with an excellent example.
II. Peeling alone could be the sole foundation of morality.
The purest example is perhaps Aristippus, whose maxim 
was that the past is gone, the future uncertain and the 
present, an ever-fleeting movement toward uncertainty; 
hence, he concluded, grasping pleasure on the wing is 
the only precept man should follow, and intensity of 
pleasure the only criterion.
III. Reason and sentiment inextricably blended are the found­
ations of morality* If either is lacking, morality is 
impossible*
The third position breaks down into two sub-positions:
A* Sentiment is disciplined by reason for the sake of 
reason. In classical theory, for instance, a harmony 
is established among the passions, often by an alli­
ance of the spirited element and reason. But the 
harmony is a rational harmony, and reason is sovereign.
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B. Passion is disciplined by reason for the sake of the 
sentiments, i.e., reason restrains factitious passions 
and cultivates the moral sentiments. It is these 
sentiments which, enlightened and informed by reason, 
develop into conscience. This, I submit, is the pos­
ition advocated by Rousseau in Emile.
In order to defend the assertion that Rousseau never separates 
reason and sentiment in his moral theory, it is necessary to exa- 
m*ne Emile detail. It must be remembered that there is no uni­
versal agreement on Emile. It is reported that Kant suspended 
his daily walks while he was reading it.^ On the other hand,
68Voltaire, with characteristic acerbity, called it a stupid romance.
And Rousseau himself claimed, "if my book is a romance, the fault
69lies with those who deprave mankind."
Emile is a plan for an education according to nature, a thor­
oughly negative education. Emile is to be preserved, like some 
rare plant, from the cankerous influence of society. He is to 
be protected from all the vice and error characteristic or social
education. The purpose of this isolation is to remove all impedi-
70merits to ,fthe natural growth of the human heart."'
Until adolescence and the first stirrings of sexuality, Emile
*3?-----------S. Korner, Kant (Baltimore, 19^4), p. 220.
^®John Morely, Rousseau (London, 1910), II, 254*
69Emile. p. 379.
70Ibid.. p. 18.
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is to receive no moral training whatsoever. The child lacks suf­
ficient rational power to grasp moral conceptions; "before the
age of reason, it is impossible to form any idea of moral beings
71or social relations." Rousseau's major concern at this stage is 
to inculcate a sense of necessity f*om physical events, in order 
to crush self-will and teach restraint of the passions. The 
child's experience is confined to tangible objects, in order that 
he may develop precision in reasoning about the physical world.
The moral education begins with the emergence of social aware­
ness and religious consciousness. Rousseau's plan is to nurture 
the primitive feelings of self-love and compassion, which have 
remained uncorrupted if Emile's early isolation from society has 
been successful. Self-love, for Rousseau, is a sort of obscure 
Hobbesian instinct for self-preservation; it is an inherent primi­
tive feeling, which is said to be theroot of all moral sentiments. 
There is some confusion between Emile and Inequality as to whether 
or not compassion is a separate primitive feeling, or a derivate 
from self-love. This issue is of little practical importance, 
however. Even if compassion is derivate, it is the first senti­
ment which emerges from self-love. "So pity is born, the first
relative sentiment which touches the human heart according to the
7 2order to nature. Both self-love and compassion are pre-reflec- 
tive feelings which, given their inchoate state, are necessarily 
vague and ill defined.
1 *Ealle. p. 53*
72rbid.. p. 184.
#Self-love is the fundamental feeling since it is the root of 
one's conception of personal worth, and the foundation of sen­
timents we must extend to other men.^ The grea  ^ *n m0ral 
education is to so enlarge self-love that it becomes self-esteem, 
j i.e., recognition of one's own intrinsic worth. Ho doubt, Rousseau, 
j like Kant, finds much of the value of human personality in the 
j capacity for self-determination; but we shall see that he places 
comparable emphasis on capacity for sentiment, i.e., the sentient 
rather than the rational character of men. In a distinctly auto­
biographical passage, Rousseau relates how he had sunk into a state
of tfmoral death”; he valued neither his own person nor those of 
7 Aothers. To arouse the moral sensibilities, the Savoyard priest 
attempted to restore Rousseau1s self-esteem, without which recog­
nition of the worth of others is impossible. Kant reiterates this 
same theme in Lectures: "nothing can be expected from a man who 
dishonours his own person. He who transgresses against himself 
loses his manliness and becomes incapable of doing his duty towards
75his fellows." Kant sums up this point of view in the phrase,
7 6"we must reverence humanity in our own person."
73-----------IJAgain we must be wary of the muddy water. By 'self-love', Rou­
sseau sometimes means mere instinctual self-preservation; other 
times he uses ’self-respect' to designate the same thing. Here 
we use 'self-love' only in the first sense, saving the terms 
'self-esteem' and 'selfishness' for the enlarged forms of self- 
love.
^Emile. p. 227.
7^Lectures. p. 1 18 .
76IMd.. p. 121.
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Prom self-esteem is derived the notion of justice. "The first
notion of justice springs not from what we owe others but from
77what is due to us." As one's self-esteem grows, one's recogni­
tion of the worth of others increases. But such recognition de­
pends on compassion, that obscure but lively feeling in natural 
aan, which must be enlarged by reflection. As a pre-reflective 
instinct, compassion is the capacity of the imagination to enter 
into, however inaccurately, the sentiments of others. Reason must 
serve to extend this capacity and lend accuracy to its function­
ing. As Rousseau points out, a man may go to the theatre and
mourn imaginary miseries, thus believing he has filled all his
78duties to humanity. commiseration is specious. Rea­
son must separate the artificial from the real, and govern our 
responses accordingly. It must enable us to perceive and evalu­
ate circumstances with precision and clarity, for "the reality
of the feelings depends to a great extent on the accuracy of the 
79ideas." if principles without springs of action are empty, then 
springs of action, unenlightened by reason, are blind.
Reason effects the enlargement of compassion, through which 
the social values, e.g., generosity, clemency or humanity, are 
generated. To be generous we must understand frailty; to be hu­
mane, we must be able to grasp the abstract idea of humanity, or 
at least to recognize the essentials of humanity in the men we
7TSmile. p. 61.
7 8Letter to D fAlembert on the Theatre (Glencoe, i960), p# 25.
79aniie. p. 188.
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encounter. In conflicts of sentiments, viz. clemency toward crim­
inals opposed to justice, reason must be the arbiter.Indeed 
the very enlargement of self-love and compassion is dependent on 
reason, for we must regulate our sentiments toward others by com­
paring them to the conception of our own v/orth. And comparison 
invokes judgment.®* To see a fellow creature in every man we meet 
requires reflection and abstraction.
It should not be thought then that Rousseau had a facile no­
tion that moral sentiments would emerge with ease and spontaneity. 
The original impulses are there, but they require much artifice 
on the part of the tutor to bring about fruition in the moral 
life. Rousseau may claim that he is merely removing impediments 
to the natural growth of the human heart; in truth, he creates 
situations in which sympathy may be elicited, and the conception 
of the essentials of humanity engendered. Emile must be exposed 
to suffering, for he cannot extend oompassion to individuals in 
circumstances he cannot understand. Thus, Rousseau advises, Mlet 
him see calamities which overtake men; surprize and startle his 
imagination with the perils which lurk constantly in a manfs 
path; let him see the pitfalls all about him.,f^
Emile must now be presented with human misery and depravity; 
he must be familiar with that mass of folly and contradiction,
Bo- - - - - - - - - - - - -Emile, p. 215*
8lIbid., p. 232.
82rbid., p. 186.
human institutions.This moment is crucial. Qnile must compare 
himself with others, if his self-awareness is to develop* But the 
act of comparison is the origin of viciousness as well as virtue; 
selfishness emerges more readily than self-respect. Selfishness, 
warns Bousseau, is by its nature insatiable. The selfish man de­
sires to gain recognition in the eyes of others, to be regarded as 
having greater worth than others. Thus he requires that others 
value him more than they value themselves. In this manner, self­
ishness generates angry and hateful passions, viz. envy, shame, 
vanity, covetousness, pride, etc. To thwart this tendency, Emile 
must be oarefully disciplined. Hie exposure to human misery must 
not be so intense that he becomes callous or moribund, like the 
damned Sonderkommando; nor must his experience of justice be so 
direct that he becomes misanthropic; nor must his estimation of 
his own worth be so inordinate that he considers himself immune 
to suffering, for callousness springs as readily from prosperity 
as from brutality.
Itaile, who is compelled to compare himself with other men, 
is thus quite different from the hypothetical natural man. As 
long as he remains in Isolation, the natural man has no occasion 
for comparison; in this sense, he is said to be innocent. Although 
he has the seeds of moral life within himself, they could never 
germinate in the state of nature. It is only with incipient so­
cial life that thess complex responses emerge. We have seen that 
the fruit can be ripe or sour, the organism crooked or straight,
40
41
all depending on the circumstances of its growth. Self-love, ex­
tended by comparison and moderated by compassion, could give rise 
to social virtues; or, lacking compassion and blown up into an 
inordinate conception of oneself, it could give rise to egoistic 
traits, envy, vanity, contempt, etc. The civilized man, whose in­
herent compassion is repressed by prudence or vanity, is more com­
monly disposed to selfishness. Thus only reason, by the machina­
tions of a highly exclusive education, can recover the lost nat­
ural feelings. "Much art is required to prevent man in society 
from being altogether artificial."®4
Conscience emerges from the perfection of the natural ssnti- 
mente by reason. Hendel Is doubtless correct in asserting, "Moral 
will has its foundation in the natural sentiments, which are not 
created by any external agency but are internal to man. Rou­
sseau himself claims that the first impulses of the heart give
86rise to the stirrings of conscience! "the motive power of con­
science is derived from the moral system formed through this two­
fold relation to himself and to his fellow m e n . i f  conscience 
is the fruition of the natural sentiments, then Bousseau's state­
ments about the infallibility of conscience take on a different 
coloration! they must be seen in light of the eduoation of the 
■oral sentiments by reason. When Bousseau claims conscience is 
the best casuist, it must be understood that he is referring to
»5c. w. Hendel. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Moralist (london. 1934),
H, 31.
86ftdle. p. 196. 
*7Ibid., p. 253.
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a type of response which is the product of elaborate cultivation. 
?or conscience is an adequate judge only when it has been nurtured
us to know good and evil; "conscience, which makes us love the
one and hate the other, though it is independent of reason, can-
88not develop without it. M Again, "goodness is only possible when
It should be clear then that Rousseau is exonerated from ac­
cusations of extreme subjectivism* He is not advocating a law of 
the heart, as Hegel understands it, nor is he promoting the rage 
of frantic self-conceit. Neither pure romantic or pure rationa­
list, he is both, in that his theory requires the interdependence 
of reason and sentiment. There is still a subjective element, 
however, for Rousseau does stress the primacy of the natural sen­
timents. Even though moral sentiment is highly cultivated and en­
lightened by reason, sentiment is the essential element in Rousseau’s 
theory. Reason is an ally, at times even a governor, but always 
for the sake of the sentiments. The question remains j what are 
the grounds for the primacy of the specific natural feelings which 
Rousseau chooses to develop.
The reply again demonstrates the intertwining of reason and 
sentiment. Reason must not only hold us on the true course of 
nature; it must first discover what that true course is. In In­
equality. Rousseau states that he is offering a hypothesis about 
the natural state of man, i.e., man before he is subjected to
from the sentiments and enlightened by reason. Reason teaches
enlightened by reason.
89rb id . .  p. 58 .
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tfcs soul ding Influence* of sooi*ty.90 He p re e e r. ta three type* 
of (TfiMBUi (l) analogy to UTt^ti, (2) analogy to beasts,
(3) th* stripping t«t; of all acculturation*, 1.*., whatever can 
conceived as aocial in origin, until only th* puroly natural 
reMlns.^ By M a n *  of th* various arguMnte, he oonolud*a that 
what la natural to m b  are the inatinot* of a*lf-pr*servation, 
coepassion and perfectibility, thia last referring to a capaolty 
for i*proTeMnt— included in perfeotlbillty is free will, the capa­
city for **lf-dat*ralnatlon. Of theae supposed natural lmpulaos, 
th* Instinct of self-pr***rratlon and capaolty for improvement 
are not difficult to aoospt. The first is evident, and the seoond 
ie defensible by the diversity of human culture. What must be 
•xaalned carefully, however, la the so-called innate compassion, 
siaoe lte function is vital in Rouaseau'a conception of the ori­
gin of ocrality. It Bight be added that what Rouaaeau is apparent­
ly trying to do ie to combat a Hobbeaiaa self-interest argument 
by slipping an lnatlnotual coopasaion Into the etate of nature.
Thus, It oould be argued that to explain the proaent state of 
*oel*ty, reason and a*lf-lntor*et are inad*quat*| one oust also 
poelt a primitive form of lntorsubjeetlvlty which would allow feel- 
ln** of ocetpassloB to aoderate aolf-lnterest.
The analogy to aavagee Bust b* roJect*d| It falls with th* 
uallinoar conception of historical dsvelopswnt. The analogy to 
beast*, especially th* *yap*thy th*y show to on* another, Is
^laoguallty. p. 198.
91Ibld.. p. 200.
open to ouaationi but there la aoee consolation is Bouaaaau'a ar- 
gua*a\. In that ha arguee from higher primates rather than rats.
Bia laat argument, the stripping mjr of acculturation*, la ap­
parently hia strongest. For, ha obaerrea, men without compaeaion 
aould have bean no battar than monatere. If an inherent for* of 
identlflcatlon with on*'a apaolaa had not moderated the impulse of 
eel f-preservation, the preeervation of the apaolaa would have bean 
doubtful. Bad man waited for the preoiae moment when eelf-love 
•* reatrainad by calculated eelf-interest, men would have oeaaed 
to eziat.
...the human raoa would long have ceaaed to ba, had 
lta preservation depended on the reaaoninga of the 
individuala coapoalng it.9?
In Jtelle. Rouaeeau preaenta aeven more or laaa dlatinct arguments
fox conscience. *' Moat of them refer to eentiaenta whioh oould
have been aoquired by olvlllsed Ufa, yet apparently depend on
Inherent oapaoity to entar into the sentiments of othera. Houa-
aeau alao auggeata that bablaa enter into an intereubjeotlve world,
even before they have oapaelty to reaaont a very young ohild re-
aponda readily to the feel Inga of othera, even though he haa no
coaoeption of their algnlflcanoe. Rouaeeau even goea ao far aa to
aeaert that the moet brutal of orlaiinala never loaae entirely this
primitive sense of oompaaaion.^4
^Inequality. p. 227.
9W l a .  pp. 250-252.
94*ndolf Hoesa, Commandant of Auschwlta, confeaaad that he felt 
a "feeling of horror" at the flrat aucoeeaful gaaaing of nine 
hundred soviet prlaonera. It moat ba noted, however, that Hoeae'a 
horror was only momentary. Erich Kulka and Ota Kraua, Death 
yactorr (Oxford, 1966), p. 125.
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If then self-love and compassion are established as natural 
feelings, we can understand Rousseau's remark that our relations to 
other men are determined by recognition of their sentient, rather 
then their rational, character,^ It is these common impulses 
from which Rousseau would cultivate the recognition of the essen­
tials of humanity. This may indeed be Karl Barth1 s point when he 
claims the human heart is the man himself^; it is the full reali­
zation of onefs existence, the worth of that existence and from 
this, recognition of a common existence*
What being here below, except for man, can observe 
others, measure, calculate, forecast their motions, 
their effects and unity, so to speak, the feeling 
of a common existence with that of his individual existence*97
Summaryt In raising objections to the lack of motive power in 
Kant’s moral theory, we have presented an elaboration of Rousseaufs 
theory of enlightened moral sentiment. We have seen that the moral 
sentiments, as distinct from factitious passions, are the springs 
of the acts of conscience*
The distinction between sentiments and passions resolves 
much of the contrariety in Rousseau^ discussion of impulse and 
restraint; reason restrains only factitious passions, in order 
that natural springs of action may be purified. Reason must act 
as the educator and the governor of the moral sentiments, it must 
even discover the true course of nature which it seeks to restore.
—
Inequality, p. 194.
96Barth, Prom Rousseau to Ritschl (London, 1959)* P* 110.
Q7Bn;lle. p. 240.
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Tfeua, Rousseau in Reveries speaks of M s  reason and conscience as 
if they were always inseparable*?8 sentiment, like a Spanish maid­
en, is always aooosipanied by her watchful duenna. This peculiar 
sllianos of reason and sentiment allows Rousseau to unify the sub- 
jective and the rational elements of moral theory, yielding, as 
we shall eee, a complex theory of natural law.
crerlea. Third Promenade (London, 1927).
CHAPTIR Pt 
IATVRAL LAW D-D IATURAL RIGHT 
Th* seoond major difference between Kant and Rousseau to bo 
examined boro concern* tb* appr*h*n*lon of tbo "oral lav. For 
Kant, the moral lav la a prlnolplo grasped by reason alona, l.o., 
it Is a purely formal prlnolplo known a priori. Rouoaoau has a 
eoro complex position regarding knowledge of ths moral law) nev­
ertheless It, too, le said to be innate In nan.
1 conclude that It la false to eay that the pre­
cepts of natural law are baeed on roaeon alone; 
they have a firmer and more solid foundation. The 
love of othex-s, springing frosi sslf-lovs, la tbs 
souros of human justioe.99
Here Roueseau prsssnts, together with the lav known by reason, 
his familiar forvuls for th* snlargem*nt and expansion of sslf- 
lovs. Self-love, "guided In man by reason and modified by com­
passion, createa humanity and v l r t u s . V I t b  oharaetorlatlo 
disdain for oonalstsnoy, Rousaeau preaente three different ver­
sion* in M X i f  .fifflttasA l n & n * ! All, however,
regard eonselsnos and ths soolal virtues a* tb* natural outcome 
»f th* prlmltlv* feel in**. And all follow th* earn* formula! from 
•elf-love we g*n*rat* a oonooptlon of our own worth; by oompasslon, 
•e extend thle oonooptlon of worth to oth*r*. Thus, Rousseau elic- 
lte from tb* natural feelings a oonooptlon of morality whloh re­
states Kant** principle of humanity in term* of lntersubjectlvlty.
^fcll*. p. 197.
;00Imsquallty. p. 223.
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It provides the underpinning of moral force which is lost by Kant's 
deduction of the principle from the * priori aoral lew. For, 
while Kant would have us follow the law from a sense of duty, Rous­
seau attempts to find an eoho of the law in the sentiments; what 
reason knows to be good, conscience ssnses to be good. Again 
reason and ssntiment are united.
Rousseau, developing his thsory of the emergenoe of consci- 
snce from the natural impulses, attempts to erect it as a theory
of natural right. "Every duty of natural law, which man's injus-
102ties had almoet effaoed from my heart, is engraven there."
In Inequality, he rejects the notion of an innate sodality, and 
asserts that from self-love and compassion "all the rules of nat­
ural right appear to me to be derived."10  ^ what Rousseau seems 
to have In mind Is a concept of natural right similar to Hobbes, 
i.e., right derived from the natural impulses of men. This right 
echoes the natural lsw revealed to reason; In other words, oonsoi- 
ence senses it to be right, while reason knows It to bs so. So 
far, all of this is consistent with what has been suggested about 
the Interdependence of reason and sentiment.
101In fairness to Ksnt, it must be acknowledged that the rigorous 
insistsno* on morsl lsw and the purity of duty is not as prev­
alent in Lectures. In this sarlier work, his emphasis lies 
clearly on the worth of humanity, not on the reoognltlon that 
they are representatives of ths moral law. His distinction 
of persons and things, In discussing humanity as an end in it­
self, implies s recognition of the Inherent vslus of the human 
personality. (Lectures, pp. 120-121.)
102B=lle, p. 255-
' I^nequality, p. 193.
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What is confusing about Rousseau's theory of natural right 
is his attempt to weld it to the voice of God* Natural impulses 
indeed may contain the seed of moral sentiments, which may cor­
respond to our conceptions of justice and virtue. But on what 
grounds could we assert that such instincts, even when they are 
fully developed, are divine instincts? In regard to primitive 
compassion, there are at least grounds for reasonable conviction, 
but this conviction establishes only the need for a nascent inter­
subjectivity, not a divine origin of morality. At times, he in­
timates there is a divine order, in which virtue will be rewarded; 
at other times, he suggests that moral feelings must be reinforced 
by religious convictions. Hendel takes the second alternative; 
for Rousseau human morality without religion is insufficient to 
meet the demands of life on men.104 Whether faith bolsters moral­
ity, or morality faith is, however, a difficult problem in Rous­
seau. That is to say, it is difficult to judge whether Rousseau 
thought that morality was founded on religion, in the sense that 
conscience is a divine inner voice, or whether it is merely rein­
forced by religious convictions.
Whatever position one takes on the relation of religion to 
morality in Rousseau, it is clear that his insistence on inter­
subjectivity is not vitiated. A theory of moral sentiments re­
quires a sense of the essentials of humanity, i.e., a realm of 
subjective experience common to all men. This awareness of com­
mon existence, emerging from my own self-esteem, is easily bru-
^^fiendel, p. 328.
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talized by prejudice, prosperity or harsh treatment. But given
the delicate conditions for its emergence, it does indeed become
a moral sense. It is these moral sentiments, no longer obscured
by vanity or illusion, which break out on Lear:
Poor naked wretches, wheresofer you are,
That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,
How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides,
Your looped and windowed raggedness, defend you 
Prom season such as these? 0 I have ta'en 
Too little care of this.1 Take physic, pomp;10t- 
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel...
Summary: For Rousseau, reason and conscience are united in the 
apprehension of natural law. What reason knows to be right, con­
science senses to be right. This emphasis on the subjective ele­
ment in the apprehension of the moral law yields a conception 
similar to the theories of natural right. In considering the gen­
eral will, therefore, it will be seen that conscience has the right 
of consent; it can give or withold approval of the general will 
as the supreme principle of legislation. Its acceptance of the 
general will implies that the general will is a moral as well as 
a political principle.
Conscience is derived from the moral sentiments, which are 
in turn nurtured from self-love and compassion. Conscience thus 
requires an implicit intersubjectivity in men if it is to recog^ - 
nize the worth of others, and to acknowledge the essentials of 
humanity. This recognition of the humanity of other men is sensed 
subjectively, in contrast to Kant's deduction of the humanity prin­
ciple from purely rational principles.
105f. Shakespeare, King Lear (Baltimore, 1966), p. 104(111, iv, 2&-35)«
CHAPTER V 
THE GENERAL WILL 
Before proceeding to the political writings, acknowledgment 
must be made of their controversial history of interpretation. 
Rousseau has been called arch individualist, collectivist, revo­
lutionist; attempts have been made to associate and disassociate 
him with the French Revolution; he has been thought to be the
enemy of ancien regime, while others have pointed out his simil-
108arity to Burke. Much of the discrepancy stems from Rousseau's
position as a transition figure, much stems from the oarelessness 
or the bias of his interpreters.
Of modern interpretations, three seem to be dominant. One 
version regards Rousseau's writings as the final flowering of 
the contract theory of Locke and Hobbes; emphasis is placed on 
the notions of the state of nature and the social contract. An­
other version stresses the influence of Montesquieu and tradi­
tionalism; Cobban and Osborn, e.g., seek to sharpen Rousseau's 
similarity to Burke, by stressing the practical writings on Poland, 
Geneva and Corsica. Still a third interpretation emphasizes the 
movement from Rousseau to German Idealism; greatest weight is 
placed on the concept of the general will and Rousseau's theory 
of consent, which requires self-legislation. It is this last ten­
dency that we shall continue to examine here, particularly the
108Alfred Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State (London, 1934),
Ch. II.
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relation of the general will to the categorical imperative* But it 
must he acknowledged that focusing attention on the Kantian ele­
ments is somewhat arbitrary, and is only justified by the neces­
sity of holding discussion within reasonable limits. While the 
question of divergent tendencies must necessarily fall into the 
background, it must not be forgotten that movement toward critical 
and idealist philosophy is ohly one of the tendencies of Rousseaufs 
political writing.
The attempt of Rousseau to pose a political solution to the 
question of morality brings us to the last difference between 
Kant and Rousseau. For Kant, the supreme principle of morality, 
the categorical imperative, has universal scope; the general will, 
on the other hand, is restricted to small political associations, 
viz, the city-state* Kant contends that all men ought to follow 
the imperative from a sense of duty; Rousseau is sceptical of self- 
imposed restraint among all men, unless it is enforced by the 
authority of the community. Even within a homogeneous community, 
it will be necessary to force some men to comply with the law, 
in order that "the social compact may not be an empty formula.
Kant rigorously maintains that in all circumstances one should 
follow the categorical imperative. But if there were no legal 
guarantees that anyone else would follow, one would have to be 
a fool or a saint to persevere in the Kantian ethic while the rest 
of mankind remained impervious. (At least, one would be obliged 
to live a life of quietism in Koenigsberg.) As Rousseau aptly
•^Social Contract, p. 18.
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says, it would "make for the good of the wicked and the undoing 
of the just.”110 The only way the categorloal imperative could 
serve as a reasonable guide to oonduct is within a political con- 
text. What one man wills, *11 men in that community must will, 
in the form of some common good desired by all citizens. To in­
sure that every man will feel obliged to comply with the general 
will and not be estranged by private interests, the general will 
must receive the authority of law. That is, from ths general 
will must emanate law, armed with adequate sanctions to subdue 
any turning away from the general interest.
No doubt Kant intended the categorioal imperative as an 
ideal, something men ought to strive for, but oan never obtain 
in this life. Cert&inly Kant's postulation of immortality in or­
der to achieve holiness of will indicates his awareness of the 
rigors of living for the sake of the law. However meritorious 
this ideal may or may not b*, it is clear that even Kant saw its 
liaitations in governing human action.
Kant, of course, does not deny the law; his conception of 
morality rests on the ideal of a well-regulated republican 
state.'111 But his distinction of morality and jurisprudsnce 
illustrates that he felt ths highsst good can never be a matter
of law; the good will rests wholly on intentions, while the law
112of the state can only be concerned with consequences. Rousseau,
^ Social Contract, p. 34.
m^ant, Psrpetual Peace (New York, 1963), p. 93.
^ 2Kant, Lectures, p. 73.
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on the other hand, attempts to make the universalization princi­
ple the source of the law of the state* His ethic therefore is 
essentially a matter of consequences. "Virtue is nothing more 
than the conformity of the particular wills to the general will." 
Emphasis on compliance does not, of course, vitiate the pure inr- 
tention of the citizen who freely wills what the law demands. 
Indeed, if law is to have the sanction of right, it must rest on 
the free consent of all of the citizens.
Making the universalization principle a political, as well 
as a moral principle, and stressing compliance with the law over 
intention, has peculiar ramifications for Rousseau's ethical the­
ory. Superficially, it would seem that he had abandoned all his 
ideas about private morality based on the cultivation of the na­
tural feelings. Of course, Rousseau had claimed earlier that law 
only restrains men without altering them. The general trend
of his writing, however, contradicts this statement. In Politi­
cal Economy, for example, he asserts, "It is certain that all 
peoples become what government makes them. in a famous pas-
sage in Confessions he repeats the same assertion; a people can 
only be as good as their laws.11** The lawgiver in the Social Con- 
tract must be prepared to change human nature. Some men must be 
forced into compliance, but those who have freely renourced the
■^Rousseau, Political Economy, p. 298.
'^Inequality, p. 263.
^Political Economy, p. 297.
'^Confessions, p. 417.
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anarchy of the passions and have accepted laws emanating from the 
general will, have achieved moral freedom. Thus the great gift 
of civilized life under universal laws is the moral life, in which 
natural liberty is exchanged for a higher freedom. The good man 
for Rousseau is the good citizen; "it is not only upright men who 
know how to administer the laws; but at bottom only good men know 
how to obey them. "^7
Even though Rousseau stresses civic virtue over private moral­
ity, he still retains all the mechanics of Kantian morality, i.e., 
autonomy of the will, self-legislation in accordance with univer­
sal laws, universalization principle, etc. The difference, how­
ever, is that the source of obligation is no longer the a priori 
moral law, but society itself, viz. the particular community sus­
tained by the general will.
If this is the case, then Rousseau has offered two possible 
approaches to the problem of morality, both intimately related to 
the mechanics of Kant's theory. Either cultivate the moral sen­
timents in a single man, or seek the imposition of good laws on 
all men. Ideally the unity of good men and good laws is to be 
sought, although its realization is unlikely. In Emile, for ex­
ample, the moral disposition is highly cultivated, but Emile must 
exist in a period when human institutions are a mass of folly and 
contradiction; the general will, except in men of refined moral 
sensibility, has fallen mute. On the other hand, the general 
will is dominant in the Social Contract, but not all men have
^ Political Economy, p. 299*
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aoral dispositions which are adequate to it.118 Prom these re-
marks, one may conclude that the hypothetical natural man can be
turned either way; he can become a man of conscience or a good
citizen* The perfect situation would be, no doubt, a man who was
a good citizen because he was a man of conscience.
If then Rousseau is advocating this solution, is there not
ample evidence that he thought positive law, generated by the
general will, replaces natural law in the state? In the first
pages of the Social Contract, he clearly rejects natural righti
"The social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all
rights* *• this right does not come from nature, and must therefore
119be founded on conventions* H He also says, quite unambiguously, 
that the citizen has renounced all rights upon entering the con­
tract! he requires "the total alienation of each associate, to­
gether with all his rights to the whole community.1,120 Cobban 
is quick to pick up this theme* "Once the state has been found­
ed, natural rights cease to function! there is no room for a 
Declaration of the Rights of Man in Rousseaufs state* Durk-
;owith's characterization of this oonfliot as being between 
the oitizen of the city-state and the spiritually free man of 
the Christian tradition appears to be an insightful character­
ization of Rousseau'8 distinction. Lowith, From Hegel to Kiet- 
zsche (New York, 1964), p. 236.
119Social Contract, p. 4.
120Ibld.. p. 14. Eousseau, of course, does not reject the right 
of consent, which is implicit in the functioning of the general 
will.
Cobban, p. 116.121
heim also argues that the state is not natural, having no "basis 
whatsoever in the hypothetical nature of man. The interdependence 
of society is wholly incompatible with natural independence#
Rather than preserve natural rights, the purpose of the state is 
to alter the nature of man.
On the other hand, there is a counter argument of the inter­
pretation just stated; it maintains there is some continuity be­
tween state and nature. The distinction between man and citizen, 
according to this position, is not absolute; it can be mitigated 
by an argument from the moral sentiments. G. D. H. Cole asserts 
that the general will is sanctioned by conscience,12  ^while
Osborn would see the innate principles of justice reflected in
12 Athe moral person of the state. These arguments are rooted in 
the claim by Rousseau that the general will is an admirable agree­
ment of interest and justice.
In considering these differences, an attempt will be made 
here to defend the second thesis, in light of the preceding dis­
cussion of conscience, and the interpenetration of reason and sen­
timent. In other words, an attempt will be made to at least miti­
gate Cobban's statement that natural rights cease to function 
in the positive state. What must be developed therefore is the 
assertion that the general will is just. But before this can be 
done, the case for pure interest must be presented.
122s. Durkhem, Montesquieu and Rousseau (Ann Arbor, i960), p, 8l.
123q. d. h . Cole, intro, to Social Contract, p. xlix.
124A. Osborn, Rousseau and Burke (London, 1940), p. 53*
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It could be argued that the general will reata eolely on an 
a*areneen of aharad lntaraata. When Individual men will what la
the coar.on good, thalr dlaparata villa marge Into a collective 
will, which embodies tba lntaraata of tha atata aa a whole. By 
thie interpretation, raetralnt would serve to eupreae blind deeire, 
and eelf-determlnation would paraIt pureuit of the general intaraat 
which, reaaon inforaa ue, la in one'a own aelf-intereet. But if 
lntereat la the aole motive of the citlsen, oogant questions about 
the nature of olvio virtue ariae. For If thla interpretation la 
correot, hae not Rousaeau reduoed moral freedom to aoae fora of 
ntllitarianien?
In reply, It muat be emphaaized that Bouaaaau never felt 
he was separating justice from lntereat. Hla expreaead aim in 
the Soolal Contract ia to "unite what right aanotlona with what 
la preecrlbed by lntereat, in order that juatioe and utility may 
la no oaae ba divided.-125 «rat i*pulae may be aelf-pra-
•erratlon, but it munt not be forgotten that tha flrat relative 
eentlment la ooaipaaeion. If lntereet la tha flrat aotive for coe- 
pllance with the general will, la there not eoma auggeatlon that 
a fora of primitive Juetica ia the eeoond motive? Rouaaaau, it 
ia eugKoetad, doea Indeed carry over Into the poaltlve atate a 
crude eenae of juatioa, which emergee from tha moral eentimenta. 
That la to aay, built into the general will ia a primitive natural 
juatice, arlalng from the recognition of our own worth, and tha
IB Social Contract, p. 3»
•xtaraion of that eorearttor. of worth to o t W n .
?o naka thl* aaaartion it nren< u  po— UI«, it aay ba Iwl^ 
JV1 to prooont it in ll^bt of Unttta prlnclp'aa. Tha rolotlon 
tho gonoral will and the cata«orieal ta|«ntlT« hao al­
ready boon daaonatratod. Inaoftr i* I will for aqraalf »hat 1 will 
for *11 m b  la ay coanmlty, I u  in i aanaa unlworaalitliie «y 
a*zla. Thi» juatioa, howwvar oruda, la apparent to raaaoat no 
doubt Kant and Rouaaaau would dafand It on atriotly rational 
trounda. Bat It waa argued earllor that Rouaaaau newer aeparatea 
raaaon and aantiaent In hla treataent of aoral rrlneiplee. For 
raaaoa aay aoaant to an equitable halanoa of lntoroat and Jnatloo, 
yet ha unablo to ooapol tho wan aa a who la to accept it. Raaaon 
aay reoognito tha (rood, hot dooa not low© 111 oonooione© ma t  ooae 
into play hero. Tharo wuat ho a eubJoetire (or hottor, lnteroub- 
Jeotiwo) eleaent if tha general will la to hare a eprla* *• Mtlon 
ether than lntaraat. If intaroat wara tha only lopolaa, tho ad- 
airahla acroooant batwoan juetioe and lntoroat would ho eeakeaodi 
tha oitiaon would ho oaloulating, hot woald not ho a *o©d wan 
aapahla of ©boyin* «ood lawo.1
In addition to lntoroat, anotbor aobjeotlwo oloawnt la eup- 
!pllad| it io found in Kant‘a priaoiplo of huaanlty and Souaeeao'e 
fonula for tha erponolon of eolf-eetooa. Inaofar aa tho ooto«or> 
ioal iaperative and tha rrlaolpla of hoaanity aro two aldoo of tho 
mm  coin, thoro ara ground© for aooortlag a ainllar relation bo-
m ---------Of. footrota 117.
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tween the general will and the moral sentiments. The difference, 
of course, is that Kant deduces the principle of humanity from the 
a priori moral law, while Rousseau finds the seeds of it in the 
natural feelings. Thus the relation between the general will and 
moral sentiment is not a matter of neat logical deduction as Kant 
would have it; rather, it rests on Rousseau's refusal to separate 
reason and sentiment. My reason affirms the justice of the general 
will; my primitive sense of natural justice impels me to accept it 
on subjective grounds. Thus reason and sentiment unite in pro­
viding both the principle of justice and the subjective springs 
to action.
To defend this assertion, we must only consult the Social 
Contract itself. "The equality of rights and the idea of justice 
which such equality creates originate in the preference each man 
gives to himself, and accordingly in the very nature of man. "12? 
Rousseau again reiterates this formula for the expansion of self- 
love, now as a defense for the claim that there general will is 
always right. Justice is built into the mechanics of the general 
will; each man submits himself to conditions he imposes on other 
men, and since no man is unjust to himself, no man is unjust to 
others.
In rc™1"! fti Rousseau develops this interplay of interest and 
justice* "the more general.. .interest becomes, the juster it is; 
and the love of the human race is nothing but the love of justice
127 Social Contract, p. 29*
12^Ibid., p. 36.
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within us." Again the vital link between justice and general­
ised interest is made, and again both reason and the subjective 
sense of justice are called upon for approbation. The general 
will does not merely rest on the abstract impersonality of uni­
versal laws} it also refers directly to the primitive sense of jus­
tice inherent in all men. Emile must learn the twofold distinc­
tion of interest and justice. As a boy, he is taught to see that 
his own interests lie in the common interest. This is an undeni­
able consequence of the division of l a b o r . L a t e r ,  he is ab­
jured to fulfill his obligations even when the general will has 
fallen mute; the laws help him to rule himself} "they give him 
courage to be just, even in the midst of the wicked.
In light of these preceding remarks, it must be concluded 
that when Rousseau claims the general will is just, he means just 
in the sense of natural justice. When he claims that the general 
will constitutes the rule of what is just and unjust, he does not 
mean that it creates justice but that it reflects justice. Un­
less this assumption is made, it could be asked what ooncelvable 
meaning the word ’just' has in the phrase "the most general will 
is always the most just."1^2 To say that the general will is just 
because it accords with the laws it has created is clearly reason­
ing in a circle. Similarly when Rousseau says that he has achieved
120
129Emile, p. 215.
13°Ibid.. p. 156.
1'1Ibld.. p. 437.
^ Political Economy, p. 291.
adairable M T N w a i of juntie# utf u t i l i t y ,  b# cuumI m u  'ja » -  
• W '  lB » * r  poaitire h b n ,  without i .comics  eatan*lo« la  O la  
difficulty. Juatio# eta only r#f#r to natural juatio#, a eo«»- 
ception of natural l t « ,  Mkaofl«4|»4 by reaeon, u l  «ob#od la  Um
I f  *>at haa been m m t M  la oorreot, It  I# only r##aonnbl# 
tbat tb# friends of intereat abould deaaad io m  explanation for 
tb* aany rear ka wblob blataatly deny tb# paaetretioa #f aoral 
•eBtlaenta and natural r l«b t  tato tba oonooptlon #f tb# etate.
peeaible reconciliation la to Interpret tb### r*ae#jr#a a# a 
d#alal that any oltls#n ba# a natural rlcbt olaia Mralnat tba 
•Ut*. Soaae aan any Indeed be oonoemed witb tb# rlabia of otb- 
are, bat it la aora probable that tba a# 1 fiab olaia# e«eiaat tba 
a tat# would predoainate. Juatio# 1# only oa# aapo#t of natural 
riffct, while ##1 f-preeerrat ion is tb# root feel in*, and tb# aouro# 
#f all otb#r#. And aelf-preaervation provld## a a iron* ar«tta#nt 
•d*in#t ooaaorlptloni tb# danger of falling into lobb##' predloa- 
aaat la Tory «r#at bar#. Tbaa, kouaaaau any have been willlna to 
aa#rifi«# traditional natural rl«bt aia«# b# waa abl# to build tb# 
foraala for tba expanalon #f e#lf-l#v# lata tb# ae#haai#a #f tb# 
«aa#ral will. A# Ion* aa tb# aoral a#atia#ata, mrtieularljr
»C f. footaotee 119, 120, ) ( .  In r#«ard t# fo#ta#ta 1JJ# loua- 
•aau’a di#ou#aioa #f tba iapoeelbility o f pr##orrlaf natural 
a#ntla#ata in aoolal I l f#  la In tb# eon text of reaarka oa tb# 
iadep#adea#« #f natural naa la  oontraat witb Ua '•r«n4eaee 
#f aoelal aan. *bat b# appear* t# be ear in* ia »i*ply tbat 
an turn 1 liberty o»nn#t b# preeerred la tb# eoeial etata.
Certainly ba eoald not bo d a la la *  tbat tba aoolal virtu## eul- 
tlwated ia te lle  nr# lacaapatlble witb tb# #lwi# virtue of tb# 
2«1>: : o r . \ T * e t. aa ll# 'o  eelf-ewffleieaoy, hoeawer, would bo 
iaadaieaable in tba Ideal ropubll#.
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justice, are reflected in the general will, and as long as the 
right of consent allows full Bcope to conscience, Rousseau could 
easily dispense with the notion of natural right as inviolable 
claims against the state.
Unless a reconciliation along these lines is accepted, it
I
arnst be asserted that Bousseau is flatly contradictory. For he
evidently does not want to allow any natural right claims against
the state, yet he clearly asserts that there are "most oertain and
universal rules by which we can judge whether a government is good
134or bad..." Lest we become David Humes, we must aoquiesoe to 
the statement that the general will incorporates these most oer­
tain and universal rules.
If there are difficult passages to accommodate by an inter­
pretation based on natural justice, it is only fair to point out 
that there are passages which are most oonfusing on the interest 
thesis. For example, how is one able to explain inoomparably 
opaque remarksi "the general will is always the most just...and... 
the voice of the people is in fact the voice of Ood."*^5 what 
relation does the general will have to the voice of Ood, par­
ticularly if the general will merely reflects the general inter­
est? On the other hand, if we assume that the general will in­
corporates a primitive justice culled from reason and the natural 
feelings, and if we assume that conscience, the perfection of the 
■oral sentiments, is indeed a divine instinot, then the connection
^Political Economy, p. 290.
135Ibid.. p. 291.
between the general will and the voice of God is not quite so ob­
scure* That is, the general will reflects the principles of jus­
tice engraven on every human heart; it objectively expresses the 
dictates of conscience, the voice of God#
If the preceding statements are correct, it becomes a simple 
matter to show how the mechanics of the general will mesh with 
Rousseau's formula for the ecpansion and extension of self-esteem. 
Self-esteem is extended to other men by compassion, but civilized 
man has learned to moderate his natural sympathy by prudence or 
brutality* Compassion lost, "when applied to societies, almost 
all the influence it had over individuals, and survived no longer 
except in some cosmopolitan spirits.,fl36 The general will, as the 
source of laws armed with sanctions, must compensate for the weak­
nesses evident in the natural feelings. Whereas compassion re­
strained man in the state of nature, its function must be per­
formed by law in the civilized state, i.e., law must compel ad­
herence to the social virtues. Virtue as described in Emile. 
however, can still operate within a legal framework. Certain 
men will by nature extend their self-esteem to others; these are 
the good men who know how to obey good laws. Other men must 
learn civic virtue; they must be taught to recognize what right 
sanctions and perceive, by reason and conscience, the justice 
inherent in good laws. Still others will only comply through 
vainglory, self-interest or compulsion.
We are not obliged, therefore, to accept Cobban1s judgment:
Political Economy, p. 252.153
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■Roueseau is at one with his contemporaries in the acceptance of
137the principle of utility." By building s conception of natural 
justice into the general will, Rousseau can offer moral justifi­
cations for obeying laws emanating from it. Both civic virtue 
and compassion are rooted ultimately in principles of virtue found 
in the heart and mind of man. Thus obedience to good laws is not 
the mere following of rational calculations of the general inter­
est. Rather, the very act of universalizing requires the princi­
ple of natural justice found in both reason and sentiment. In­
terest may at first motivate compliance, but eventually justice 
must dominate, if the good men mentioned above will indeed know 
how to obey good laws. Rot only interest, but also perception 
of the intrinsic rightness of the laws, must be their principle 
and their spring to action.
Sumnaryt While Kant regarded the universalization principle as 
a principle of morality, Rousseau thought of it as a political 
as well as a moral principle. This emphasis by Rousseau on the 
need of a political setting suggests that he thought practice of 
the social virtues would oultivate in men the disposition to obey 
laws without being compelled by force. That Is to say, obedience 
to good laws, even when forced, is a form of moral training, nome- 
what comparable to the sentimental education in Bnile. Kant does 
speak of the cultivation of moral sentiments in Lectures, but in 
his formal system he completely neglects the nurturing of a pure 
■oral disposition. Since he does insist on the need for a form
i37Cobban, p. 139.
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of government in which morality can prosper, it is not inconceiv­
able that he would accept the notion that obedience to good laws 
could create good men* On the other hand, his insistence on the 
purity of the motive in a moral act led him to conclude that posi­
tive law can only require external compliance, while morality was 
concerned essentially with the purity of intention.
In regard to natural right, it is claimed that a form of 
natural justice is built into the general will, in the sense that 
justice is required by the act of universalization. Any man whose 
self-esteem is fully developed will be just to himself; the mech­
anics of the general will require him to be just to others.
Kant*s principles of universalization and humanity parallel 
Rousseau’s general will and the formula for the extension of self­
esteem. While Kant understands both as principles of reason, Rous­
seau sees the necessity for an alliance between reason and senti­
ment. Thus, the general will provides the objective moment; the 
formula for the extension of self-esteem into the moral sentiments, 
the subjective moment.
It is submitted then that the general will is a moral as well 
as a political principle, in that it echoes the principle of jus­
tice inherent in every man. Insofar as justice is a subjective 
reflection of divine moral law, Rousseau's contention, its reflec­
tion in the general will implies an element of natural law built 
into the mechanics of universalization. It is for this reason 
that obeying the laws emanating from the general will is a form 
of moral education. For in complying with the general will, we
are following inherent principles of justice, known objectively 
by reason, and sensed subjectively by conscience*
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are never separated
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Rousseau
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
The problem of impulse and restraint has been the root of 
nany divergent interpretations of Rousseau* Emphasizing impulse 
oas caused many commentators to stress moral sentimentalism; oth— 
emphasizing restraint, have tended to find elements of ethi­
cal rationalism. Both elements, of course, are present in Rous­
seau. At times he tells us to follow the heart} at other times, 
he claims morality is only possible through the restraint of the 
passions. In dealing with these apparently contradictory concep­
tions, commentators have tended to accept one and banish the 
other. What has been attempted here is a reconciliation between 
them.
To resolve the difficulty, a theory of enlightened moral 
sentiment has been presented, in which both impulse and restraint 
are necessary. A comparison with Kant revealed that autonomy of 
the will and self-legislation are elements of Rousseau's moral 
theory. But restraint and self-determination serve not to supress 
all impulses} rather, Rousseau would select among the natural feel- 
ings those impulses which could be nurtured into moral sentiments* 
Kant, on the other hand, is required by his conception of freedom 
to reject all impulses whatsoever. For this reason, he cannot sup­
ply subjective motives for complying with the moral law. Rousseau 
is not hindered by a conception of freedom which rests on the nou— 
aena-phenomena distinction. He accepts freedom as a given of con­
sciousness; it is evidenced by the power one has to restrain and
«4aaato faollac* and [tiiUu,
Saatralat 1* sMtiitrj if » M  is to eoaquar 
•laaa and uaaataral daairaa laeuloatad hjr •octal cvUa. n « H  la- 
f.aaod paaaiona auat b« aupraaaa* if tha natural atriaca to aotloa 
ar* to ho paurlflad. 0m« ordar la lapoaad by roaaoa on Um ?*•- 
•l«aa, loeaaaau oould nurtura the natural lajwlaoa of aalf-lovo 
eoapaaalon Into an acqulrad dlapoal tlon, in vhlch tha ooral 
•aetiaaata, rls. ol«a«ncy, juatica, ffaaaroaltjr, ato., arc U a  
loalaaat aotlwaa. Froa thaaa raflaad aantiaonta, ftouaaaaa would 
•altirata ooaaoloneo, tha ao-oallad lnnar aoral aja. Thaa, la 
-oatraat to Kaat’a pura will, whlah oonquara all lopulaaa and fal- 
lawa I ha aoral la* fro* duty alona, kouaaaau would carefully oul- 
tlwata a dlapoaltlon which would laoliao ona to<t>oy tho aoral la*.
■has kouaaaau adrocatao tha la* of tk« haart, ho la tbaro- 
faro apoakmc of a hi«hljr oultlwatod aoral aaaalhlllty, wfciah la 
tiaalyllnad and laforaad by roaaon. kaaaoa and aantlaaat work la 
•eSaaa alllaaooi If althar la no«laotad, •uhjootlviaa or aa aaptjr 
'•raallaa aaaritaa. Ba eartainljr doaa not adwooata tha lloaaalag 
*? lapalao and paaalon la aaa who hava uadar«o«o a tboraufh trail*- 
'•at af tha aoral aaatlaanta. To crant llaaaao to hllai lapwlao 
•ad aatridlod paaaloa would ho to aaloooo a "haart of <Urkaaaa"
•f tha worldi It would aa*andar all tho«a dl*ord*r* Conrad ao 
**watlj faarod.
Tha natural lapulaaa, aolf-1 owa aad eavpaaaloa, aaat ho a»- 
•««ad aad artoadod ao that thajr flooor lato tho aaral •aaUaoata. 
•olf-lowo, oaa ran* rata a a coaeoftloa of hia snrlaola worthi
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by compassion, one extends this conception of* worth to others,
Bousseau often presents this idea by means of a formula* self- 
love, guided by reason and modified by compassion, creates humani­
ty and virtue. This formula for the enlargement and extension of 
self-love restates in terms of intersubjectivity the Kantian prin­
ciple of humanity. Since Rousseau's formula is derived ultimately 
from certain natural impulses, it retains the motive force which 
is lost in Kant's deduction of the principle of humanity from purely 
formal principles of reason.
Rousseau accepts the notion of a natural law issuing from 
reason alone, and adds to it a conception of natural right derived 
from conscience, once conscience has matured through the cultiva­
tion of self-love and compassion. In the apprehension of natural 
law and natural right, reason and conscience are united; what rea­
son conceives to be right, conscience senses to be right. There 
is here, no doubt, a similarity between conscience and what Kant 
means by respect, in that both acknowledge the rightness of certain 
principles of reason. The difference between conscience and respect, 
however, rests on Kant's denial of impulse. That is, for Kant, 
respect is generated by a sheerly intellectual apprehension of 
the moral law. Rousseau would deny that any purely rational law 
could generate moral sentiments. Rather he would claim that we 
are disposed to obey an objective moral law because that law re­
flects moral sentiments which are found in the moral conscience.
To know the good is not to love the good; the disposition to re­
spond to the moral law must be implicit in all men, and actual in
the man of cultivated moral sensibility.
If conscience is the basis of natural right, in that it sen­
ses the rightness of principles of natural law, it should have the 
right to judge the positive law emanating from the general will.
If Rousseau is correct in asserting the general will is a princi­
ple of justice, then conscience has the right to judge the laws 
issuing from it. Thus reason and conscience must be united in 
their approbation of the element of natural justice built into 
the general will.
The interdependence of reason and conscience, and the rami­
fications of this alliance of natural right and the general will, 
derive ultimately from the presence of both impulse and restraint 
in Rousseau's moral theory. They must not therefore be regarded as 
the sources of two contradictory tendencies in Rousseau's writings, 
but rather as necessary elements in a theory of enlightened moral 
sentiment.
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